Online sustainability information in local governments in an austerity context: An empirical analysis in Italy and Spain by Brusca, I. et al.
1 
 
 
ONLINE SUSTAINABILITY INFORMATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN AN 
AUSTERITY CONTEXT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN ITALY AND SPAIN  
 
Purpose: The present research aims to analyse and compare how austerity has influenced online 
sustainability information in Italy and Spain. 
Design: We relate austerity policies to online information in order to ascertain whether austerity 
plays a role in the financial, organizational, social and environmental information disclosed on local 
government websites. The research has been conducted by analysing the websites of all Italian and 
Spanish local governments with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Findings: The results show that institutional and legislative pressures, as well as austerity measures, 
have played a relevant role in the increased production of information by local governments, 
although not all information is fully provided. 
Originality/value: The results may be of interest to managers and politicians as a stimulus to 
increase the flow of information. They may also be useful to policy makers, regulators and other 
stakeholders in order to foment environmental information. 
 
Keywords: Online information, Sustainability, Austerity, Local government, Comparative research, 
Italy, Spain.  
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1 Introduction 
Governments are facing austerity with increasing cuts in their budgets at a time when their 
incomes are decreasing and there is an increase in the demand for public services (Alt and 
Lowry, 2010; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012;  Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014). “Since the 
crisis has structural reasons, any reasonable plan to solve it needs to address them and to use 
the language of transparency” (Caperchione et al., 2014, p.135). To inform citizens of the 
reasons behind these policies and to promote democratic participation may help governments 
to legitimize their policies (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007). Governments are using the 
information and communication technologies (ICT) to enable and promote citizen 
participation in policy formulation and evaluation and to encourage greater information 
exchange between citizens and government (Macintosh and Whyte, 2008).  
This research aims to analyse the dissemination of online information related to sustainability 
(including both financial and non-financial aspects) of Italian and Spanish local governments 
(LGs) in an era of austerity. The study attempts to identify the degree to which governments 
carrying out austerity policies have adopted the appropriate communication strategies. Our 
main contribution is the study of the impact of austerity on online information and the 
comparative perspective of the determinants of local government transparency.  
Italy and Spain have introduced austerity policies promoted by the European Union and both 
have recently passed transparency laws. The two countries have similar cultural and 
administrative traditions, which may drive the way people think and act (Hofstede, 2001). 
Nevertheless, some contextual and institutional factors (e.g. density of population, education, 
engagement in political activities, legal framework) as well as citizen predisposition towards 
governments (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) can create differences in the way in which LGs 
tackle the need for increasing transparency in times of austerity, and these factors deserve to 
be investigated.  
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The analysis covers all Italian and Spanish LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants. We have 
considered the Global Reporting Initiative’s sustainability reporting framework (supplement 
for public agencies, GRI 2010), as a reference to select the information on organizational, 
financial, social and environmental aspects published by LG on their websites. We related 
some characteristics of LGs and austerity measures (in terms of changes in the level of taxes, 
revenues, capital expenditure and debts) to investigate the relation - if any - between austerity 
policies and online information. 
The research is organized as follows. Section two presents an overview of the literature on 
austerity and online information used to design the hypotheses that are then tested in the 
study. Section three describes the Italian and Spanish contexts while section four presents the 
research methodology. The empirical results are shown in section five. Section six is devoted 
to a discussion of the results and the main implications.  
 
2 Transparency and online information in local government 
Transparency has become a key factor in the reforms of public administrations around the 
world (Hood, 2006; Piotrowski and van Ryzin, 2007; Guillamón et al., 2011; Meijer, 2013), 
as well as being a means of reacting to austerity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). According to 
the literature, transparency can be defined from the principal–agent theory, considering it as 
“the ability to find out what is going on inside a public sector organization through avenues 
such as open meetings, access to records or the proactive posting of information on Web 
sites” (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007, p. 308) or from an institutional perspective as “the 
availability of information about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the workings or 
performance of the first actor” (Meijer, 2013, p. 430). In both cases, citizens should be 
considered not only as recipients of the activities of public entities but also as collaborative 
partners for building democratic and effective governance (O’Leary et al., 2010). 
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Consequently, LGs tend to enhance transparency while citizens require an increasing amount 
of information, possibly including access to all public documents and deliberations which can 
have consequences for the management of resources (García-Sánchez et al., 2013). However, 
we must be aware that transparency does not always produce the benefits claimed for it and 
that it may provoke some negative effects.  
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate on this question (transparency optimists versus 
transparency pessimists, Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011: 36; or proponents versus opponents, 
Meijer, 2009). Some empirical studies provide evidence that transparency does not always 
lead to greater participation (Welch, 2012) or to an increase in citizen trust 
(Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Curtin and Meijer (2006, p. 120) 
include some interesting arguments urging caution on the question of transparency: few 
citizens access the information provided and those that do are confronted with an information 
overload; the information could result in more negative stories in the press and undermine 
legitimacy; and transparency can be used as an excuse by policymakers to stick to strict 
procedures and avoid innovative solutions. Bearing in mind these possible limitations, our 
research does not intend to test the consequences of transparency, but rather to depict the 
extent to which information is released on the websites of Italian and Spanish LGs in times of 
austerity. 
 
2.1 Factors driving online information 
The motivations of governments to disclose information have been argued in the literature 
from different theoretical approaches (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2009; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 
2014) that can be used as a motivation of our study.  
First, the increasing interest in accountability and transparency by LG can be explained by the 
legitimacy theory (i.e. Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Roberts, 1992). From this perspective, LGs 
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(like other corporations) have to act within the boundaries of what is considered socially 
acceptable and consistent with citizens’ expectations. So, legitimisation can be achieved if the 
entity operates in a way that is consistent with social values (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Furthermore, decision makers may increase their legitimacy simply by carefully justifying 
their decisions after they have been taken behind closed doors (de Fine Licht et al., 2011). In 
fact, people informed about decisions affecting their everyday lives are more willing to accept 
the process by which the decisions have been taken if they are given an insight into the 
reasoning behind the decisions. Therefore, LGs should consider what is acceptable to citizens 
and, at the same time, release more information to explain the results obtained. The 
application of the legitimacy theory in an era of austerity may lend support to the idea that the 
introduction of transparency can help governments to obtain legitimacy in spite of the 
adoption of measures that involve sacrifices from citizens, both in terms of higher taxes and 
fewer services or investments.  
Other scholars have framed the determinants of transparency within the boundaries of the 
agency theory (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Gandía and Archidona, 2008):  citizens act as the 
principal while managers and politicians are the agent. Online information may reduce 
uncertainty about the agent’s behaviour, thereby making the principal more confident in 
delegating powers to the agent (Holmström, 1979). Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2014) argue 
that online sustainability information is influenced by media pressure as most of the news 
published focuses on negative issues, so entities under closer scrutiny by the media are less 
inclined to disclose information.  
However, the interest of politicians in disseminating information will depend on the level of 
interest shown by the citizens which, in turn, is reflected in their engagement and political 
participation. Moreover, from a principal-agent perspective, it is possible to relate fiscal 
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revenues and fiscal pressure – which are the typical means of austerity policies – with the 
dissemination of information (Ferejohn, 1999)  
Another strand of the literature (Ball and Grubnic, 2009) has interpreted the increasing 
production of information from the perspective of the new institutional theory. This theory 
emphasizes the existence of isomorphism to explain changes, suggesting that governments 
will be pushed into different practices by isomorphism, trying to do what other similar 
governments do. With regard to sustainability reporting, Mussari and Monfardini (2010) 
consider the adoption and diffusion of tools such as social, environmental or gender reporting 
in the Italian public administrations as an isomorphic process triggered by normative 
processes, mimetic isomorphism and coercive mechanisms.  
In accordance with the theories mentioned, the influence of austerity should be similar in 
Italian and Spanish LGs. Nevertheless, some differences may emerge in a comparative study 
due to certain internal characteristics. In fact, as already shown by scholars (Marcuccio and 
Steccolini, 2009), LGs are affected by various contingent factors in disclosing information 
(e.g., educational level, internal culture, citizen engagement, etc.) which may differ, especially 
between countries. Thus, it is worth testing whether these differences exist. 
2.2. Development of hypothesis 
Previous studies have shown that the information provided on LG websites has increased over 
time in response to a number of factors (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Caba et al., 2008; Alt and 
Lowry, 2010; Albalate del Sol, 2013; García-Sánchez et al., 2013). Scholars have generally 
promoted the idea of increasing transparency as a means of reducing the risk of corruption 
and of enhancing accountability, as well as a result of democratic participation (Yetano et al., 
2010). Under austerity policies, transparency through online information can be interpreted as 
a way of explaining political choices and the value for money of public services. Looking at 
cutback policies, we would expect that a reduction both in capital expenditure and in total 
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expenditure would lead entities to release more information, both to justify the rationality of 
their choices and to gain legitimacy as well as to give a proper explanation of the way in 
which resources have been employed. In addition, we want to test whether there are 
differences between Italian and Spanish LGs in the impact of austerity measures.  
Thus, we can set our first and second hypotheses as follows:  
Hypotheses1: The entities with a higher decrease in capital expenditure 
disseminate more information. 
Hypothesis 2: The entities with a higher decrease in total expenditure 
disseminate more information. 
In an era of austerity, transfers by central government and revenues tend to be reduced. Even 
if LGs can exercise stronger fiscal pressure, this cannot compensate for the reduction of 
transfer and other revenues. As a consequence, the total amount of revenues tends to be 
reduced year by year. In this situation, the rationality offered by the theoretical framework 
adopted suggests that entities should provide more detailed explanations about the use of 
financial resources as well as sustainability matters. Thus, keeping our comparative 
perspective, we set the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The entities with a higher decrease in total revenues disseminate 
more information. 
From a principal-agent perspective, it is possible to relate an increase in fiscal revenues - due 
to higher fiscal pressure per capita - with the dissemination of information: citizens want to 
know how their money has been spent. Ferejohn (1999) evidences a positive relation between 
taxes and the demand for transparency. Guillamón et al. (2011) demonstrate that in Spain 
municipalities collecting more taxes disclose more financial information. However, in the 
same context, Caba et al. (2008) found no significant influence. Thus, we intend to test the 
following hypothesis in a comparative perspective: 
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Hypothesis 4: The entities with higher fiscal pressure disseminate more 
information. 
Austerity policies aim to produce a reduction in government debt, both at central and local 
level (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). In line with legitimacy theory, LGs that act within what 
is considered legally and socially acceptable will be more interested in disseminating 
information. Similarly, agency theory states that in entities that behave responsibly the agents 
will be more interested in giving information to the principal to reduce uncertainty. In the 
literature, some scholars have found that financial and social information has been adopted as 
a tool to inform about the financial equilibrium and to access public funds (Marcuccio and 
Steccolini, 2005; Guillamón et al., 2011). 
Consequently, we can expect that a reduction in the level of debt will lead to greater financial 
disclosure as a result of a successful application of austerity policies. Previous studies (Evans 
and Patton, 1987; Fisher et al., 2005) have discussed the association between debt and the 
voluntary disclosure of public financial information. Albalate del Sol (2013) shows that the 
debt level has no effect on fiscal transparency. Similarly, Guillamón et al. (2011) find no 
statistical relationship between debt and transparency in Spanish municipalities. On the 
contrary, Alt, Lassen & Rose (2006), analysing a sample of OECD countries, report that when 
LGs debt increase, the transparency decreases. 
Thus, always from a comparative point of view, our last hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: The entities with a higher decrease in the level of indebtedness 
disseminate more information. 
To strengthen our analysis, several control variables representing the municipal context 
(transfer for capital expenditure per capita) and internal factors (citizen engagement and 
educational level) have been added to our model, following the extant literature. 
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In the context of austerity, the interest of politicians in disseminating information will also 
depend on the level of interest shown by citizens which, in turn, is reflected in their 
engagement and political participation. Previous studies demonstrate that there is a close 
interconnection between transparency and political participation (Piotrowski and Bertelli, 
2010, Yetano et al. 2010).  
Moreover, the educational level of the population has also been considered as a determinant 
of a demand for greater transparency (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 
2007). Taking into account the relation between education level and transparency, we expect 
that well-educated people are more likely to demand innovation and greater transparency 
from their LGs (Tolbert et al., 2008). 
Lastly, we include size as a control variable to verify to what extent there are differences 
between larger entities and medium-sized entities. Some prior research shows that 
municipalities with larger populations have a greater dissemination of information (Pina et al., 
2009; Albalate del Sol, 2013). 
 
3. The legal framework in Italy and Spain  
In Italy and Spain, public administrations have been driven to introduce significant cuts in 
budgets in the last few years because of the financial crisis (so called Spending review). This 
situation, coupled with the high level of corruption perceived by citizens in both countries 
(Survey by TNS Opinion & Social for the European Commission, 2014), has meant that 
transparency has been a priority of governments. Table 1 shows the structure of Italian and 
Spanish LG.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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3.1 Transparency and Online Information in Italy 
The Italian public administration has a three-tier structure: National Government, Regional 
Governments (21) and Local Governments, comprising 110 Provinces and 8,092 
Municipalities, most of which have few inhabitants, as Table 1 shows. 
Different kinds of forces drive Italian public administrations towards greater transparency and 
social reporting exploded around the middle of 2000’s as a kind of Italian fashion (Marcuccio 
and Steccolini, 2005; Mussari and Monfardini, 2010). The most significant regulation is the 
Legislative Decree 150/2009, which has added an evaluation system of performance in all 
areas of the public administration to enhance transparency regarding services and worker 
performance. Moreover, since February 2013, open access through the LG websites to 
information about organization, performance and financial data as well as information on the 
management of each area of the public administration has become mandatory (decree 33) and 
each administration has had to create a special section on the LG website called “Transparent 
Administration” and to appoint an official responsible for transparency. In addition, a strong 
institutional pressure to enhance transparency has been exerted by the CIVIT (the 
Independent Commission for Evaluation, Transparency and Integrity of Public 
Administrations – the National Anti-Corruption Authority). 
As regards social and environmental reporting, even if it is not mandatory, there are three 
main guidelines that a large number of ILGs tend to follow (Secchi, 2006): those issued by the 
Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica in 2006 (operating within the Ministry of the Interior), 
the standards proposed by the GBS (the Group for the Social Reporting) between 2004 and 
2013, and the international standard prepared by GRI (2011).  
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3.2 Transparency and Online Information in Spain 
The political structure of Spain consists of a state level, the regional level (17 Autonomous 
Communities) and local level (52 provinces and 8116 municipalities). In Spain, as in Italy, the 
majority of the municipalities are small. 
In Spain, the law 19/2013, on “Transparency, access to public information and good 
governance” requires the publication of institutional, organizational and planning information, 
juridical information and economic, budgetary and statistical information. The law gives 
regional and local governments a period of two years to adapt to the compulsory 
requirements. It makes no mention of how the information should be published, missing the 
opportunity to require the use of open data standards such as those of the World Wide Web 
Consortium.  
In the environmental area, the law 27/2006 aimed to facilitate the gradual diffusion of 
environmental information to the public, but not all public entities publish such information, 
which are still voluntary (García-Sánchez et al, 2013).  
Previous studies have mainly analysed the transparency of economic and financial 
information, showing that there are significant differences in transparency between Spanish 
local governments (SLG) (Gandía and Archidona, 2008; International Transparency-Spain, 
2013). There are very few papers that deal with the publication of sustainability information 
in SLG (Navarro et al., 2010; García-Sánchez et al., 2013), but all available studies conclude 
that local entities have limited experience of providing social and environmental information 
(Navarro et al., 2010; García-Sánchez et al., 2013).  
 
4. Research methodology 
In order to investigate what information is published by local governments, we have analysed 
the websites of all Italian and Spanish LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants, assuming that 
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larger municipalities have greater economic and technological resources and that they are 
responsible for large communities, so would publish more information than smaller ones 
(Serrano-Cinca et al., 2009; Tagesson et al., 2013). The sample originally comprised 46 
Italian and 59 Spanish LGs, but we had to eliminate two Italian entities due to the lack of 
some financial data.  
We have constructed an index of total disclosure using as a reference the Supplement for 
Public Agencies of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2010) and following the same 
method already used in previous studies (Caba et al., 2008; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2011). 
According with it, we have identified a list of 52 items that have been analysed in local 
government websites (see Appendix 1).  
The information has been grouped into four areas: organizational profile, strategy and 
governance (A, 16 items), financial information (B, 21 items) social information (C, 11 
items) and environmental information (D, 4 items). In the area of social information, we have 
included a special section about citizen participation and democracy, which can be considered 
an essential part of the transparency process.  
In order to analyse the influence of austerity policies on transparency, we have collected 
accounting data from the financial reporting of the LGs in 2008 and 2011 (For ILGs, we have 
collected the information on the database managed by the Ministry of the Interior and 
available at http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.php/in/inputIn/4 while, for the SLGs, we 
have obtained the data on the website of Ministry of Public Administrations, 
http://www.minhap.gob.es). To test our hypotheses, we have considered five different 
measures as proxies of austerity, as detailed in Table 2. We have also included the expected 
sign of the variables, according to the definition of the hypothesis.  
13 
 
We have also introduced some control variables to capture the influence of other financial 
factors representing the municipal context (transfers for capital expenditure per capita) and 
internal factors (citizen engagement and education level).  
In order to test to what extent these variables behave differently in Italian and Spanish LGS, 
we have included the interaction of all the variables in the table with the country.  
[TABLE 2HERE] 
 
To analyse the effect of the independent variables on the total disclosure index, we have 
constructed a model of dependency, using multiple linear regression, as follows:  
  Y=  α +β1 Δ KE + β2 Δ TE + β3 Δ TR+ β4 FP + β5 Δ FP+ β6 Δ FS  +  β7 TKE + β8 Cit_eng + 
β9  Ed_lev + β10 LN(Size) + β11 Δ KE*Country + β12 Δ TE*Country  + β13 Δ TR*Country + β14 
FP*Country  + β15 Δ FP*Country  β16 Δ FS*Country   +  β17 TKE*Country  + β18 Cit_eng*Country  
+ β19 Ed_lev*Country  + β20LN(Size)*Country +  ε 
In order to identify whether a stronger relation exists between any specific area of our 
disclosure index and the independent variables selected, the model has been repeated for each 
of the four areas. The model parameters in the study were estimated using SPSS software. 
The regression has been estimated using the stepwise procedure. To check the robustness of 
the results, we tested whether the selected models fulfill the assumptions for linear regression: 
Cook's D statistics have been used to test influential points; the Variance Inflation Factor of 
the variables introduced into the model allows us to check that there are no problems of 
multicollinearity; and the plots of the residuals and predicted values have been used to check 
the homoscedasticity of the errors. 
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5. Analysis of Results 
5.1. Online Information in Spanish and Italian Local Governments 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each group into which the information index 
has been clustered, as well as the total index for both countries. The analysis is based on the 
mean of the items disclosed for the two countries. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
As can be seen, the level of information is low in most of the areas: in Italy the mean is over 
fifty percent of the items only for organization profile, strategy and governance information 
(61.63%); while in Spain the percentage is over fifty percent of the items only for 
environmental information (53.50%).  
In particular, concerning the first area Italian and Spanish entities disclose more information 
about the operational structure of the organization, the governance structure and the political 
managers, whereas disclosure of information about challenges and targets for the entity is 
still low in both countries (see Appendix 1). 
In financial information, around 44.41% (44.48% in Italy and 44.57% in Spain) of the items 
are disclosed in both countries. Nearly all entities disclose the initial approved budget, while 
the percentage of entities that publish the execution of the budget is only 45.45% in Italy and 
64.41% in Spain (details in the Appendix 1). The balance sheet and operative statement are 
also disclosed by a high percentage of entities, especially in the case of Italy. This area 
contains a higher percentage of the total items analysed (21 out of 52) and the results show 
that it represents a relevant percentage in the total disclosure of LG. This result confirms the 
relevance of financial information in the transparency of LGs (Navarro et al, 2010; García-
Sánchez et al, 2013), as it is one of the most important components of public accountability. 
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Analysing the dissemination of social information, it can be seen that LGs on average 
disclose about 5 items (45.64% in ILGs and 43.18% in SLGs). The mean value for 
disclosure of social information is slightly higher for Italy than for Spain. 
Lastly, examining the dissemination of environmental information, results show a wider 
disclosure in Spain, since it can be observed that ILGs on average disclose about 1item 
(30.00%) while SLGs disclose about 2 (53.50%). 
In order to compare the situation in the two countries, Levene's test and the T-test have been 
applied (Appendix 2). Differences are statistically significant for organizational profile, 
governance and strategy and environmental information, as Italian LGs show greater 
transparency than the Spanish. This difference could be explained by different institutional 
pressures.  
The T-tests show that the difference between means is not statistically significant for either 
the financial information items or for those relating to social information. On average, 
Italian and Spanish LGs have a similar level of disclosure in financial information. This can 
be interpreted as a result of a coercive isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) because 
in both countries the legislative pressure for transparency is focused mainly on economic 
information. Furthermore, in Italy the law (Leg. Decree 33/2013) that makes disclosure of 
the aforementioned information mandatory is very recent and there are no penalties for local 
governments that do not disseminate this information. 
However, as a result of legislative pressure (Leg. Decrees 150/2009 and 33/2013) high 
attention has been paid in Italy to the organizational profile (9.86) (Table 2), with the 
dissemination of information about missions or values and codes of conduct as well as 
service procurement procedures and the number of employees. There are also differences in 
environmental information, as Spanish entities pay more attention to this kind of data.  
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Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations (parametric) between the different groups, with the 
p-values in brackets. In both countries, there is a moderate correlation between the four 
groups, slightly higher in Spain. ILG presents a moderate correlation (0.533) between social 
information and organizational profile, strategy and governance information while for SLG 
financial information shows a higher correlation with social information (0.656) and 
environmental information (0.684) while the latter two groups are positively correlated with 
each other (0.677). 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
In Italy, this relation can be explained by the fact that laws related to the diffusion of 
financial information have also invited entities to disclose social information as well as 
information concerning the organization and management of each public administration. 
The production of a separate sustainability report is voluntary and the widespread 
availability of these reports could also be read as a result of institutional pressure coming 
from the European Commission which has issued a variety of communications to encourage 
LGs to adopt sustainability strategies and to voluntarily report on these activities (Farneti et 
al, 2010).  
The behaviour of Italian and Spanish LGs can also be considered in the light of the 
legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) because LGs disclose social and 
environmental information in order to demonstrate to citizens that their activities are 
consistent with citizens' expectations (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). In Spain, entities that 
want to be transparent include the three types of information, confirming previous research 
results (García-Sánchez et al., 2013). 
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5.2 Drivers for online information in an austerity context 
Table 5 shows results of the regression analysis for each area as well as for the total 
disclosure. Considering that we have ten independent variables and that our aim is to select 
those that have greater explanatory power over the dependent variable, the stepwise model 
regression has been used to select the predictive variables with an automatic procedure 
(Hopkins and Ferguson, 2014).  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
As can be seen, for the overall level of information, there are three significant variables: 
variation in total revenues, relative variation in fiscal pressure and transfers for capital 
expenditure*country. The first two variables have a negative influence while the last has a 
positive influence. The first variable indicates that entities that have suffered a higher 
reduction in their revenues and, thus, face greater austerity, give more information. The 
second one indicates that the entities that have had a greater increase in fiscal pressure give 
less information. The effect of the variables is similar in the two countries: with the same 
level of variation in revenues or in fiscal pressure, an Italian and a Spanish entity give similar 
levels of disclosure. The third variable shows that entities with a higher level of transfers for 
capital expenditure have introduced more information onto their websites. Moreover, this 
variable has a different effect in each country, higher in Spain than in Italy.  
Focusing on organizational profile, strategy and governance, three independent variables are 
statistically significant: variation in total revenues, transfers for capital expenditure received 
and the fiscal pressure per capita. The interpretation of the first will be directly related to 
austerity, as those entities that suffer a greater reduction in their revenues give more 
information. The transfers for capital expenditure positively influence the level of 
transparency: in this regard, it should be noted that this is often the consequence of the 
requirements that other entities can impose when they finance capital expenditure. Similarly, 
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higher fiscal pressure positively affects disclosure. This can be interpreted using the agency 
theory, as those entities that raise more money directly from citizens through taxes are more 
interested in giving general information to reduce conflicts. 
However, with respect to financial information, there are only two variables which 
significantly affect transparency in the model: size and the transfers for capital 
expenditure*country. The first variable shows that bigger entities disseminate more financial 
information. Therefore, in line with some previous studies (Pina et al., 2009; Albalate del Sol, 
2013), our results show that size positively affects the dissemination of financial information 
on the website. Moreover, the entities with a higher level of transfers for capital expenditure 
have introduced more information in their websites. This can be explained by the fact that 
entities with a high level of transfers for capital expenditure obtained by successfully 
competing for national or European subsidies for specific projects have to explain how such 
resources have been employed. Moreover, the variable affects each country differently, higher 
in Spain than in Italy. 
Regarding information in the social area, there are two significant variables in the model: 
transfers for capital expenditure*country and the relative variation in capital expenditure. 
The first variable has a positive sign, showing that a higher level of transfers for capital 
expenditure is linked to a higher level of social transparency. The effect is also different in 
each country, being higher in Spain than in Italy. The second variable, with a negative sign, 
shows that entities that have reduced their investments are more interested in offering 
information about the salaries of the politicians and in the use of democratic participative 
tools that can make citizens aware of austerity policies. 
Finally, our results show that environmental reporting is not influenced by austerity measures. 
Therefore, the municipality's budgetary capacity is not a major determinant for greater 
environmental transparency (García-Sánchez et al, 2013). The only significant variable is the 
19 
 
size of the local governments*country. The positive and significant relationship between size 
and environmental disclosure is consistent with previous results obtained by Frost and Semaer 
(2002) and García-Sánchez et al, (2013). Largest municipalities have introduced more tools 
for management (Torres et al. 2011) and can have more possibilities for environmental 
disclosure. The effect is different in each country, higher in Spain than in Italy. Therefore, as 
already shown before, Spanish entities pay more attention to this kind of data.  
Of the five variables chosen to analyse the influence of austerity measures on transparency, 
the relative variation of capital expenditure (as a proxy of austerity) is the only significant one 
with respect to social information, so our first hypothesis can be partially accepted.  
The third hypothesis can be accepted: focusing on the results of the overall disclosure and 
organization disclosure, entities facing a reduction in their revenues are more likely to give 
more information to justify their policies and, especially, to explain how this can affect 
organizational aspects.  
Fiscal pressure also influences the level of disclosure of LGs in the area of organizational 
information. Entities with higher fiscal pressure give more information to citizens, which 
leads us to accept - although partially - our fourth hypothesis. This confirms the results 
obtained previously by Ferejohn (1999) which indicated a positive correlation between the 
amount of taxes and the transparency level of public entities.  
However, the relative variations in total expenditure and in the debt have not been 
significant in the model and consequently our second and fifth hypotheses should be 
rejected. 
However, the results show that the variation in debt per capita has no influence on the 
dissemination of information by Italian and Spanish LGs. In the literature there is a debate 
on this issue. Some previous research results (Alt and Lassen, 2006, Albalate del Sol, 2013) 
have indicated that the level of debt is not significant while others (Evans and Patton, 1987; 
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Fisher et al., 2005) have revealed a positive relation between debt and the disclosure of 
public financial information. Finally, our results show that transparency is related neither to 
political participation, thus diverging from previous studies (Piotrowski and Bertelli, 2010), 
nor to the educational level. The latter is line with the results of Caba et al. (2008) for Spain.  
 
Conclusions 
LGs are facing austerity and cutbacks in their budgets, which has motivated a public debate 
about whether these policies are appropriate or not. Informing citizens of the reasons behind 
these policies and promoting democratic participation may help governments to legitimize 
their policies. However, there is no information available about how austerity can influence 
transparency in practice.  
Italy and Spain have both introduced austerity policies driven by the European Union and 
both have recently passed transparency laws as a tool for fighting corruption, requiring 
public administrations to inform citizens about their activities. Furthermore, both countries 
have similar cultural and administrative traditions, but some country-specific factors could 
create some differences (Marcuccio and Steccolini, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) in 
how austerity measures influence the dissemination of information. Thus, comparing the 
results obtained could allow a better understanding of the influence of the context on 
transparency. 
An analysis of the websites of all Italian and Spanish LGs with more than 100,000 
inhabitants has highlighted that the objectives of transparency have only partially been met, 
and that differences arise between different information areas. In fact, the area with the 
highest level of disclosure is that of organizational profile, strategy and governance. On the 
other hand, financial information has average values which reveal that governments disclose 
under 50% of the items analyzed. Disclosure of social and environmental information is also 
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low. This shows that in spite of the political promotion of transparency as being a principal 
objective of the parties in power and its continual emphasis in social networks and the 
media, in practice there is still room for improvement.  
In Italy laws requiring greater disclosure of information have progressively been introduced 
in the last few years, including a comprehensive Transparency Law, while in Spain such 
information disclosure will be mandatory in 2016, possibly producing further changes in 
entities that, at present, do not even publish their budgets. Nevertheless, the differences 
between the two countries are limited, apparently supporting the idea that mimetic is even 
stronger than coercive isomorphism. 
Our results show that austerity measures - in particular as far as they affect the relative 
variation in total revenues, in capital expenditure and capital expenditure per capita - have 
influenced the disclosure of information. These results can be interpreted through the lens of 
the legitimacy theory: entities facing greater austerity are more interested in informing 
citizens in order to gain their trust and obtain legitimization. Moreover, from the agency 
theory perspective, politicians and managers, as agents, give more information to citizens 
(principals) in a context of austerity in an attempt to reduce uncertainty and consequently 
gain consensus. It is, however, difficult to assess whether or not greater transparency has 
really increased legitimacy and to evaluate the persuasive effects of transparency.  
The study does have a further limitation due to the fact that many other variables that 
potentially affect disclosure could be considered, and these would probably enhance the 
explanatory power of the models. In any case, our objective was not to explain the level of 
transparency, but rather to show to what extent transparency of financial and non-financial 
information is widespread in Italian and Spanish Local Governments and to what degree 
austerity measures have affected the dissemination of information. Given that our results 
show that those entities facing higher austerity provide more information, a twofold 
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contribution can be derived from this research: to have shed light on the relation between 
austerity and transparency and to have offered useful insights for local government 
managers and politicians as a stimulus for increasing the amount of information released and 
for creating stronger citizen awareness of the information released (with forums, press 
releases and other media) as well as for policy makers and regulators to support the 
enhancement of such information. In future research, it would be of interest to test whether 
those entities with higher transparency have in fact achieved more legitimacy or not and to 
examine the effects that transparency can have in practice. A further development of this 
research could be a comparison between countries belonging to different administrative 
systems, to verify whether stronger differences in transparency arise. This is a field that 
deserves more empirical analysis. 
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 Table 1: Dimension of Italian and Spanish Local Government 
 Italy Spain 
Provinces 110 52 
Municipalities 8092 8116 
 With more than 100,000 inhabitants 46 59 
 100,000 -50,000 inhabitants 95 86 
 50,000 -20,001 inhabitants 366 254 
 20,000-5,001inhabitants 1883 915 
 With fewer than 5,000 inhabitants 5702 6802 
 
Source: Census by Italian National Institute of Statistics (2011) and Spanish Ministry for Public Administration (2012) 
 
Table 2. Definition of independent variables 
Variable Definition Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
ΔKE (Relative Variation in 
capital expenditure) 
Capital exp. 2011-Capital exp. 2008/ Capital exp. 
2008 
H1 - 
ΔTE (Relative Variation in 
total expenditure) 
Total exp. 2011-Total exp. 2008/ Total exp. 2008 H2 - 
ΔTR (Relative Variation in 
total revenues) 
Total rev. 2011-Total rev. 2008/ Total rev. 2008 H3 - 
FP (Fiscal pressure per 
inhabit.)  
Fiscal revenues 2011/n. inhabitants H4 + 
ΔFP (Relative Variation in 
fiscal pressure) 
Fiscal pressure 2011- Fiscal pressure 2008/ Fiscal 
pressure 2008 
H4 + 
ΔFS (Relative Variation in 
debt per capita) 
Debt pc 2011- Debt pc 2008/ Debt pc 2008 H5 - 
TKE (Transfers for capital 
expenditure per capita)  
Transfers capital expenditure 2011/n. inhabitants Control 
variable 
+ 
Cit_eng (Citizens 
engagement)  
% of participation to the last election Control 
variable 
+ 
Ed_lev (Educational level) Population with studies after 16 years/population 
over 16 
Control 
variable 
+ 
Size Ln (number of inhabitants) Control 
variable 
+ 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
 Country Mean % Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
mean 
Organizational profile, strategy and 
governance information  
Italy 61.63% 9.86 3.515 .530 
Spain 44.94% 7.19 3.324 .433 
Financial information  Italy 44.48% 9.34 2.803 .423 Spain 44.57% 9.36 5.668 .738 
Social information  Italy 45.64% 5.02 1.592 .240 Spain 43.18% 4.75 2.862 .373 
Environmental information  Italy 30.00% 1.20 .851 .128 Spain 53.50% 2.14 1.468 .191 
Total information  
Italy 48.90% 25.43 6.953 1.048 
Spain 45.04% 23.42 11.227 1.462 
 
 
Table 4 - Correlation between the areas  
ITALY Organizational profile, strategy and governance 
Financial-
information 
Social-
information 
Environmental-
information 
Organizational profile, 
strategy and governance 
information 
Financial information .505 (0.000)
Social information .533(0.000) .358(0.017)
Environmental information .507(0.000) .340(0.024) .408(0.006)
SPAIN  Organizational profile, 
strategy and governance 
Financial-
information 
Social-
information 
Environmental-
information 
Organizational profile, 
strategy and governance 
information 
Financial information .533(0.000)
Social information .509(0.000) ,656(0.000)
Environmental information .451(0.000) ,684(0.000) .677(0.000)
 
 
  
Table 5 Austerity and sustainability information by Italian and Spanish LGs 
  OVERALL 
 StandardizedCoefficient t Sig.
Relative variation in total revenue -.333 -3.664 .000
Relative variation in fiscal pressure .211 2.154 .034
Transfers for capital expenditure*country .363 3.676 .000
R-squared  .178  
F model 8.295 .000
 ORGANIZATIONAL FINANCIAL 
 Standard. Coefficient t Sig.
Standard. 
Coefficient t Sig.
Rel. variation in total revenues -.371 -4.273 .000 -.215 -2.269 .025
Fiscal Pressure per capita .195 2.261 .026 0.154 1.619 .109
Transfers for capital expenditure .310 3.600 .001 0.062 .622 .535
Transfers capital  expend.*country 0.012 .131 .896 .310 3.272 .001
R-squared  .267 .108  
F model 13.281 .000 7.135  .001
 SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
 Standard. Coefficient t Sig.
Standard. 
Coefficient t Sig.
Relative variation in capital ex. -.299 -3.143 .002 -0.027 -.283 .778
Transfers capital  expend.*country .256 2.684 .009 0.164 1.643 .104
Size *country -0.047 -.442 .660 .381 4.120 .000
R-squared  .111 .137  
F model 7.316 .001 16.972  .000
 
  
Appendix 1 . Items included in the transparency index 
A) Organization profile, strategy and governance information Italy Spain 
Strategy of the council 59.09% C 61.02% V* 
Strategies about sustainability 47.73% V 57.63% V 
Main challenges for the next year  36.36% C 49.15% V* 
Main challenges for the next 3-5 years 31.82% C 28.81% V* 
Politicians responsible  97.73% C 96.61% V* 
Operational structure of the organization  97.73% C 93.22% V* 
Number of employees 95.45% C 20.34% V 
Environmental responsibility, or Sustainability department 90.91% V 72.88% V 
Governance structure of the organization 100.00% C 91.53% V* 
Ethical or good governance code 59.09% C 22.03% V 
Statements of mission or values, codes of conduct, and principles 68.18% V 22.03% V* 
Services procurement procedures 81.82% C 23.73% V* 
Externally developed economic, environmental, and social principles to 
which the organization subscribes 36.36% 
V 
40.68%
V 
Memberships of associations 34.09% V 30.51% V 
List of stakeholder groups engaged by the organization 22.73% V 5.08% V 
Approaches to stakeholder engagement 27.27% V 3.39% V 
B) Financial information       
Initial Approved Budget 97.73% C 91.53% V* 
Modifications of the budget  6.82% V 67.80% V* 
Explanation of modifications of the budget  11.36% V 55.93% V 
Execution of the budget 45.45% C 64.41% V* 
Budget of decentralized entities 9.09% V 45.76% V 
Detailed budget reporting 22.73% V 55.93% V* 
Consolidated budget 0.00% V 57.63% V* 
Consolidated reporting  6.82% V 3.39% V 
Consolidated Performance Reporting  4.55% V 1.69% V 
Single Report including all financial information 18.18% V 33.90% V 
Balance Sheet 93.18% C 62.71% V* 
Performance Statement 81.82% C 62.71% V* 
Performance Indicators  77.27% C 5.08% V* 
Audit Statement 27.27% C 33.90% V* 
Service charters 97.73% C 40.68% V 
Financial statements of controlled entities  50.00% C 13.56% V 
Gross expenditure broken down by financial classification  70.45% C 66.10% V* 
Current expenses by financial classification  56.82% C 64.41% V* 
Capital expenditure by financial classification. 56.82% C 42.37% V* 
Economic criteria that apply to expenditure and financial commitments. 4.54% C 0.72% V* 
Reference to open data 95.45% C 66.10% V 
C) Social information        
Labor practices  25.00% V 40.68% V 
Human rights (non-discrimination) 13.64% V 57.63% V* 
Society (impact on the community, corruption) 6.82% V 27.12% V 
Product responsibility (customer health and safety) 4.55% V 38.98% V 
Dialog boxes for sending suggestions to political representatives 68.18% V 74.58% V 
Establishing contact with political representatives via email 95.45% C 33.90% V 
Videos or reproduction online of board sessions  61.36% V 18.64% V 
Discussion forums and chats to discuss specific issues 50.00% V 47.46% V 
Social criteria that apply to expenditures and financial commitments. 4.55% V 37.29% V 
Salary of politicians responsible 100.00% C 25.42% V* 
Department and procedures for citizen participation 72.73% V 72.88% V 
D) Environmental information       
Environmental Indicators 20.45% V 72.88% C 
Local Agenda 21 81.82% V 61.02% V 
Procurement policy relating to sustainable development. 13.64% V 42.37% V 
Environmental criteria that apply to expenditure and financial 
commitments. 4.55%
V 37.29% V 
 
C: Compulsory; V: Voluntary, V*: Voluntary at the moment of the study but compulsory since 2016. 
  
Appendix 2. - Independent sample T-test of dependent variables 
 
 
 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances T-Test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t gl 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed)
Difference 
of Means 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Organizational profile, 
strategy and governance 
information 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.095 .758 3.945 101 .000 2.677 .679 1.331 4.023
     
Financial information Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
 
-.018 89.322 .986 -.015 .850 -1.705 1.675
Social information    
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.625 94.227 .534 .277 .443 -.603 1.157
Environmental 
information 
   
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
4.045
95.830 .000 -.931 .230 -1.388 -.474
Total information    
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.116 98.027 .267 2.008 1.799 -1.561 5.577
